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 PRECEDENTIAL 
 
       Filed March 8, 2002 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 00-2184 
 
IN RE: RFE INDUSTRIES, INC. 
 
FRY'S METALS, INC.; 
CAMERON & MITTLEMAN 
 
v. 
 
JOHN J. GIBBONS, Trustee for the Estate of RFE 
Industries, Inc.; ANTON NOLL, INC.; WESTBURY ALLOYS, 
INC.; SPARFVEN & COMPANY, INC.; MICHAEL SPARFVEN 
 
Fry's Metals, Inc., 
       Appellant 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civ. No. 00-cv-01868) 
District Judge: Hon. William H. Walls 
 
Argued November 1, 2001 
 
Before: SLOVITER, NYGAARD, and CUDAHY,* 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 8, 2002) 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
* Hon. Richard D. Cudahy, United States Court of Appeals for the 
       Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation. 
 
  
       Jonathan I. Rabinowitz (ARGUED) 
       Henry M. Karwowski 
       Rabinowitz, Trenk, Lubetkin & 
        Tully, P.C. 
       West Orange, N.J. 07052-3303 
 
        Attorneys for Appellant, 
       Fry's Metals, Inc. 
 
       Lawrence K. Lesnick 
        (ARGUED) 
       Ravin Greenberg P.C. 
       Roseland, N.J. 07068 
 
        Attorney for Appellee, 
       RFE Industries, Inc. 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
Cudahy, Circuit Judge. 
 
Fry's Metals, Inc. (Fry's) appeals from the judgment of the 
district court affirming the order of the bankruptcy court, 
which denied approval of a settlement between Fry's and 
the former Trustee of RFE. We vacate and remand. 
 
I. 
 
On August 19, 1997, RFE Industries, Inc. (Debtor or 
RFE) voluntarily filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 
of the United States Bankruptcy Code. On September 8, 
1997, RFE received authorization to sell its MFE Division, 
which processes and refines metals, to Anton Noll, Inc. 
(Anton). Anton agreed to make an up-front payment of 
approximately $400,000 and to pay "royalties" to RFE for 
three years. RFE expected the royalty payments to be, at a 
minimum, about $360,000 per year. 
 
On November 10, 1997, John J. Gibbons was appointed 
as Chapter 11 Trustee for Debtor's estate because of 
allegations of "fraud or gross mismanagement of the affairs 
of the Debtor by current management." On February 13, 
1998, Anton agreed to sell the MFE assets to Fry's and 
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Westbury Alloys, Inc. (now Sparfven & Company, Inc. or 
Sparfven) for at least $950,000. After the sale, Anton failed 
to remit any royalty to RFE, so Gibbons sued Anton, 
Sparfven and Fry's for breach of contract and certain state 
torts. After discovery, Gibbons and Fry's agreed to a 
settlement of the estate's claims against Fry's (the 
Settlement). The estate's claims against Anton and Sparfven 
are unaffected by the Settlement. 
 
Meanwhile, because RFE was successful in challenging 
some claims by its creditors and in settling other claims, 
RFE was able to pay all its creditors in full. Thus, Gibbons 
and RFE moved to dismiss the bankruptcy case. Fry's then 
objected, however, that the Settlement had not yet been 
approved by the bankruptcy court. To satisfy Fry's 
objections, the Dismissal Order stipulated that the 
bankruptcy court would retain limited jurisdiction to 
"enforce and consummate a previously agreed-upon 
settlement between some of the parties thereto." 
 
Notice of the Settlement was then sent to all parties and 
a hearing date was set. At the hearing, Gibbons and Fry's 
moved for approval of the Settlement. RFE objected. The 
bankruptcy court initially approved the Settlement, holding 
that RFE had waived any objections to it. Later, developing 
some doubts about whether RFE had actually waived its 
right to object to the Settlement, the bankruptcy court 
asked the parties to file supplemental briefs on that issue. 
After another hearing, the bankruptcy court vacated its 
prior order and entered an order denying approval of the 
Settlement. On July 18, 2000, the district court entered an 
order affirming the bankruptcy court's order. Fry's appeals. 
 
II. 
 
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. This 
Court exercises plenary review of a district court's decision 
in a bankruptcy matter. In re Gi Nam, 273 F.3d 281, 285 
(3d Cir. 2001). 
 
A. 
 
The Dismissal Order of RFE's bankruptcy case provides: 
"Notwithstanding the entry of this order, this Court shall 
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retain jurisdiction of the pending adversary proceeding 
captioned John J. Gibbons, Trustee v. Anton Noll, Inc., Fry's 
Metals, Inc. v. Sparfven & Company., Inc. et al, adversary 
proceeding number 99-2331 to enforce and consummate a 
previously agreed-upon settlement between some of the 
parties thereto." Fry's argues that the Dismissal Order 
specifically limited the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court 
to the enforcement and consummation of the Settlement. 
Hence, Fry's argues that the bankruptcy court had no 
jurisdiction to review the merits of the Settlement. Here, we 
review whether a bankruptcy court has subject-matter 
jurisdiction de novo. 
 
All parties agree that the bankruptcy court has 
jurisdiction over the Settlement despite the case's being 
dismissed. Fry's merely seeks to narrow the jurisdiction of 
the bankruptcy court to the enforcement and 
consummation of the Settlement. In this connection, 
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9019(a) provides that 
"[o]n motion by the trustee and after notice and a hearing, 
the court may approve a compromise or settlement." Fed. 
R. Bankr. P. 9019 (1993) (emphasis added). We note 
particularly that the Bankruptcy Code uses the word"may" 
and not "must." Thus, the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction 
includes the power to disapprove a settlement. Allowing 
dismissal orders to narrow the authority of the bankruptcy 
court in the circumstances presented here would deny the 
bankruptcy court power to consider such matters as 
possible collusion between trustees and third-parties. 
Hence, in the interest of preserving a meaningful level of 
review, we hold that the bankruptcy court had power to 
disapprove (as well as to approve) the Settlement. The 
standard of review that the bankruptcy court must apply in 
approving or in disapproving a settlement is a matter we 
will discuss below. 
 
B. 
 
Gibbons, the Trustee, and Fry's entered into a settlement 
of the estate's claims against Fry's. Because RFE did not 
participate in the Settlement, Fry's argues that RFE had no 
standing to object to the Settlement. We review the issue of 
standing de novo. 
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In order for a settlement to be approved by the 
bankruptcy court, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 
9019(a) provides that "[n]otice [of the settlement] shall be 
given to creditors, the United States trustee, the debtor, and 
indenture trustees as provided in Rule 2002 and to any 
other entity as the court may direct." Fed. R. Bankr. P. 
9019 (1993) (emphasis added). It is implicit in the debtor's 
being given notice in this fashion that the debtor may 
object to a proposed settlement. Further, in this case, the 
party most clearly adversely affected by the Settlement (and 
perhaps, since there are no creditors, the only  party 
adversely affected by the Settlement) is RFE. Therefore, RFE 
has standing to object to the Settlement even though it was 
not a party to the Settlement. 
 
C. 
 
Gibbons and RFE moved to dismiss RFE's bankruptcy 
case because RFE's creditors had been paid in full. Due to 
Fry's objections, RFE included in its proposed Dismissal 
Order the language about the bankruptcy court's retention 
of jurisdiction over the Settlement. Thus, Fry's argues that 
RFE, by agreeing to this restrictive language, waived its 
right to object to the Settlement or should be equitably 
estopped from objecting to the Settlement. The issues of 
waiver and estoppel are reviewed de novo, although the 
bankruptcy court's findings of fact are accepted unless 
clearly erroneous. See In re New Valley Corp. , 89 F.3d 143, 
148 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
Waiver is the "intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right." United States v. Dispoz-O- 
Plastics, Inc., 172 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). Fry's argues that RFE 
waived its rights to object to the Settlement when RFE 
proposed the language in the Dismissal Order that provided 
for the retention of what could be construed as limited 
jurisdiction by the bankruptcy court. However, the 
bankruptcy court found that RFE had not waived its rights. 
Because the language of the Settlement had not been 
disclosed to third parties, including the Debtor, RFE had no 
idea what the Settlement entailed. RFE therefore could not 
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have intentionally relinquished a known right when it did 
not know what it was relinquishing. 
 
Fry's also argues that RFE should be equitably estopped 
from objecting to the Settlement. "Parties claiming equitable 
estoppel must establish that (1) a representation of fact was 
made to them, (2) upon which they had a right to rely, and 
(3) the denial of the represented fact by the party making 
the representation would result in injury to the relying 
party." Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. McCune, 836 F.2d 
153, 162-163 (3d Cir. 1987). Fry's claims that, when RFE 
proposed the language in the Dismissal Order, RFE 
represented that it would not object to the Settlement. If 
Fry's had known that RFE would object to the Settlement, 
Fry's now claims that it would not have agreed to the 
dismissal of the bankruptcy case. Thus, Fry's seek to estop 
RFE from objecting to the Settlement. Fry's argument is 
unpersuasive. First, even if the bankruptcy case had not 
been dismissed, RFE would still have been able to make 
objections at a hearing on the Settlement. More 
importantly, RFE could not (and likely did not) make the 
representation that Fry's alleges that it made. As previously 
noted, the Dismissal Order gave the bankruptcy court 
apparently limited jurisdiction to "enforce and 
consummate" the Settlement. But because the power of the 
bankruptcy court cannot be narrowed by the Dismissal 
Order, that order can only be read to permit the 
enforcement of a properly approved Settlement. Proper 
approval of a settlement requires that the Debtor have an 
opportunity to make any objections to the settlement. RFE 
had not had any opportunity to make such objections to 
the Settlement. Further, the language in the Dismissal 
Order does not plainly state that RFE was waiving any such 
opportunity. Therefore, RFE's proposal of the language in 
the Dismissal Order was not a representation by RFE that 
it would not object to the Settlement. 
 
Thus, we hold that RFE had not waived its right to object 
to the Settlement and is not estopped from objecting to the 
Settlement. 
 
D. 
 
Turning to the merits, Fry's urges this Court to approve 
the Settlement in light of In re Martin, 91 F.3d 389, 393 (3d 
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Cir. 1996), or, in the alternative, remand to the bankruptcy 
court for an analysis of the settlement under the Martin 
factors. We review de novo whether the bankruptcy court 
should have analyzed the Settlement under the Martin 
analysis 
 
In Martin, we held that a bankruptcy court should 
examine four factors in deciding whether to approve or 
disapprove a settlement. See Martin, 91 F.3d at 393. These 
factors are: (1) the probability of success in litigation, (2) 
the likely difficulties in collection, (3) the complexity of the 
litigation involved, and the expense, inconvenience and 
delay necessarily attending it; and (4) the paramount 
interest of the creditors. See id. 
 
Here, the bankruptcy court did not make any findings of 
fact on these four issues. Rather, it disapproved the 
Settlement on the grounds that RFE had not waived its 
objection to it, and the bankruptcy case no longer existed. 
However, these grounds are insufficient under Martin and 
cannot support the approval or the disapproval of a 
settlement. For example, the failure to waive objections to 
the Settlement goes to the question of standing or the 
existence of affirmative defenses, not to the reasonableness 
of the Settlement. Similarly, the dismissal of the 
bankruptcy case goes to the question of the jurisdiction of 
the bankruptcy court, not to whether the Settlement should 
be approved or disapproved. We agree with Fry's that the 
bankruptcy court should have examined the Settlement 
under the Martin framework. Here, the bankruptcy court 
retained jurisdiction over an unresolved matter of RFE's 
bankruptcy case--the approval or disapproval of the 
Settlement. Because the bankruptcy case is still ongoing as 
to that matter, the bankruptcy court must examine the 
Settlement using the Martin analysis. Hence, we remand for 
an examination of the "fairness, reasonableness and 
adequacy" of the Settlement in light of the factors listed in 
Martin. In re Glickman, Berkovitz, Levinson & Weiner, P.C., 
204 B.R. 450, 455 (E.D. Pa. 1997). Because the situation 
has changed drastically since Gibbons first negotiated the 
Settlement, the bankruptcy court should examine the 
Martin factors in light of the present circumstances. For 
example, since there are no creditors involved, the fourth 
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factor in Martin test will need to be modified. Substituting 
the paramount interest of the shareholders of RFE for the 
paramount interest of the creditors appears to be 
consistent with the purpose of the Martin test--to maximize 
the recovery of those to whom the company has obligations. 
The judgment of the former Trustee, Gibbons, is also 
entitled to less deference since RFE is no longer in 
bankruptcy. 
 
III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the judgment of 
the District Court and remand for further proceedings. 
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